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V 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of the Final Order dated October 15, 2008 by the 
Honorable Judge Robert Faust in the above-captioned case in trial court. [R275.] 
This Court has jurisdiction by assignment from the Utah Supreme Court § 78A-4-
103(2)0). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: The trial court disregarded the parties' contract containing a fee-
shifting provision, and refused to award attorney fees and costs to either party. 
Did the trial court incorrectly disregard the contract and should attorney fees 
and costs have been awarded to 14 Solutions? 
WHERE PRESERVED: Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees [R237]; and 
Notice of Appeal [R282.]. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Attorney fee decisions that involve questions 
of law or statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness.1 
{A.K & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 94 P.3d 270, 272 (Utah 2004); 
see also Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041, 1044 (Utah 2007). 
VI 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code § 78B-5-826: 
Attorney fees - Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed 
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees. 
Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
When attorney fees are authorized by contract or by law, a request for attorney fees 
shall be supported by affidavit or testimony . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The parties executed a work-service agreement containing a fee-shifting 
provision (the "Contract"), pursuant to which 14 agreed to design an Internet 
website for Robertson. Robertson subsequently sued 14 for improperly designing 
the website, and 14 counterclaimed for monies owed for properly designing the 
website. Final judgment against Plaintiff/Appellee Robertson and in favor of 
vii 
Defendant/Appellant 14 was entered on 14's unjust enrichment counterclaim after a 
bench trial in 2008; however, the trial court refused to award attorney fees pursuant 
to the fee-shifting provision in the contract. The issue on appeal involves the 
propriety of the trial court's refusal to award attorney fees and costs. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Third Judicial District Court conducted a bench trial on August 28, 
2008. 
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION 
The trial court found for Defendant/Appellant and against Plaintiff/Appellee 
in the amount of $1,800, but ordered both sides to bear the cost of their own 
attorneys' fees. [R275.] 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
(l)Plaintiff/Appellee Robertson Marine ("Robertson") initiated this contract 
action against Defendant/Appellant 14 Solutions ("14") on March 9, 2006 
seeking damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising out of 
14's alleged failure to complete the design of a website on the Internet for 
Robertson. [R001.] 
(2) 14 filed compulsory counterclaims in response to Robertson's claims, 
viii 
including counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, 
alleging it had finished designing Robertson's website and was owed unpaid 
monies under contract. [ROM.] 
(3) A contract which was executed April 19, 2005 between Robertson and 14 
(the "Contract") formed the basis of both the claims and counterclaims, and 
contained a fee shifting provision requiring the non-prevailing party to pay 
the prevailing party's attorneys' fees. [R001 at Exhibit A.] Robertson 
expressly agreed in the Contract in writing, "I agree to pay all collection 
costs, including court costs and reasonable attorney's fees if collection is 
required," [Id. (emphasis added).] 
(4) Plaintiff and Defendant both attached the Contract to their trial pleadings 
[Id], motions and memoranda [R099 at Exhibit A], included it in exhibit 
lists [R209], and stipulated to its admissibility before trial. The Contract 
was repeatedly referred to during both parties opening statements [R294 
Trial Tr. 6:12 - 10:11], and throughout the bench trial over two hundred 
times. Robertson asked the trial court for attorney fees at the close of trial in 
accordance with the Contract, reminding the trial court the Contract required 
them, moving the trial court orally as follows at R294 162:8-20: 
ix 
MR. MCINTYRE: Your Honor . . . Robertson's has spent a whole lot 
of money trying to get their money back. I think [Roberson] also 
ought to be entitled to attorney's fees. 
THE COURT: I didn't look at the contract, does it contain an 
attorney's fee clause? 
MR. MCINTYRE: It does, your Honor. 
(5) After a bench trial held on August 28, 2008, the Honorable Judge Robert 
Faust ruled against Plaintiff/Appellee Robertson on all of Robertson's 
claims, and found for Defendant/Appellant 14 on 14's unjust enrichment 
claim in the amount of $1,800. [R233.] 
(6) Affidavits of attorney fees were submitted before the ruling by both parties 
in accordance with Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R225; 
R229.] 
(7) Despite finding for 14, in its minute entry of September 3, 2008, the trial 
court refused to award attorney fees and costs to either party, ruling that 
"[e]ach side is ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs." [R225.] 
(8) 14 subsequently moved the trial court to award attorneys' fees, but had its 
motion denied. [R237; R269.] 
(9) The Final Order of October 15, 2008 likewise required that "[e]ach side is 
X 
ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs." [R275.] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The contract executed by the parties which underlies this dispute requires the 
loser to pay the prevailing parties' attorney fees. The trial court erred in not 
awarding attorney fees. Defendant/Appellant 14 was the prevailing party, and is 
entitled to attorney fees under the law. 
XI 
ARGUMENT 
Attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Defendant/Appellant 14 
Solutions ("14") in this case, including fees expended on trial as well as those 
expended on appeal. Fees and costs should be awarded because: (1) the contract 
underlying the dispute contained a fee-shifting provision; (2) 14 defeated all of 
Plaintiff/Appellee Robertson Marine's ("Robertson") claims in trial; and (3) 14 
prevailed and was awarded judgment on its own counterclaims. 
I. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONTAINS A FEE-
SHIFTING PROVISION AND WAS PART OF THE RECORD 
The contract between the parties for services was executed on April 19, 2005 
between Robertson and 14 and is indexed in the record as ROOl at Exhibit A 
(hereinafter the "Contract"), and is attached hereto as Addendum A. Pursuant to 
the terms of the Contract, Robertson paid $3,275, or fifty-percent (50%) of the 
contract price, to 14 on April 19, 2005, with the remaining balance of $3,275 due 
upon completion of the Robertson's website in accordance with the Contract. [Id.] 
After the webdesign was completed, Robertson sued 14 for the return of it original 
$3,275 payment and 14 counterclaimed for the remaining amount owed under the 
Contract of $3,275. [R001;R014.] 
The Contract contained a fee-shifting provision, marcated by hand before 
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being executed, reading, "I agree to pay all collection costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees if collection is required" and signed by Robertson. [R001 at 
Exhibit A.] 
Both parties made the Contract part of the record as set forth above. 
II. 14 PREVAILED ON ITS COUNTERCLAIMS AND ROBERTSON 
FAILED TO PREVAIL ON ITS CLAIMS 
In a bench trial on August 28, 2008, Robertson lost of all its claims and 
recovered nothing. 14 was awarded $1,800 against Robertson on its counterclaim 
for unjust enrichment by the Court ruling, "[jjudgment is awarded in favor of 
Defendant on its unjust enrichment cause of action for $1,800." [R233.] The final 
order entered by the Honorable Judge Faust was silent as to disposition of 14's 
breach of contract claim, but held that the elements of breach of contract were met 
as discussed below. Appellant submits that the trial court ruled impliedly that 14 
prevailed on both of its counterclaims, not just for unjust enrichment, but also 
breach of contract. 
A. The Trial Court Held that 14 Carried its Burden of Proof on Each of 
the Elements of Breach of Contract. 
The elements of the breach of contract claim in Utah are: (1) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other 
party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, f 14, 20 P.3d 
2 
388. 
In its ruling of September 3, 2008, the Court found each of the elements 
necessary to sustain Defendant/Appellant's breach of contract claim in its findings 
of fact, including that "the parties had an agreement concerning the preparation of 
a website by Defendant for Plaintiff5 [R275 at f^ 2 ]; as well as that "Defendant 
performed these services by completing the majority of the work on Plaintiffs 
website" [Id. at | 2]; and that Defendant "is entitled to be paid for the same 
[$1,800]" [Id. at f 13]. The Court recognized the written Contract in determining 
damages, when it referred to "the value of $6,550.00 in the agreement between the 
Parties." [Id. at ^15.] 
III. ATTORNEY FEES MUST BE AWARDED IN STRICT 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT 
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, by failing to award attorney fees in 
strict accordance with contractual language of the parties' written contract. Rule 
73(a) of the URCP provides that "[w]hen attorney fees are authorized by contract 
or by law, a request for attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit." Affidavits of 
attorney fees were submitted to the trial court in anticipation of an attorney fee 
award. 
The Honorable Judge Faust may have felt it was not equitable to award 
3 
attorney fees that would exceed the amount of the judgment itself, but attorney fees 
in Utah are awarded as a matter of right that arises from a contract or statute with 
regard to equitable principles.2 Where fees are provided for by contract, they are 
allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the contract and are not subject 
to an equitable standard of evaluation by the court because they are awarded as a 
matter of legal right. 
Accordingly, since the right is contractual, the court does not have the same 
equitable discretion to deny attorney fees as it does when applying a statute that 
allows for discretion. Therefore, the provisions in contracts that allow for attorney 
fees ".. .should ordinarily be honored by the courts."3 
Plaintiff/Appellee agreed in the Contract, which formed the basis of this 
action, to pay attorney fees, acknowledging expressly, "I agree to pay all collection 
costs, including court costs and reasonable attorney's fees if collection is required," 
and attorney fees should be awarded. 
IV. UNDER ALL POSSIBLE LEGAL ANALYSES, 14 IS THE 
PREVAILING PARTY. 
Utah Code § 78B-5-826 provides that, "[a] court may award costs and 
attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
2Foote v. Clarkf 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). 
"Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 809 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
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promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, 
when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow 
at least one party to recover attorney fees." 
Defendant/Appellant 14 is the prevailing party in this action. Under each of 
the three analyses that might be applied to record, Defendant/Appellant is the 
prevailing party. In the first legal analysis, Defendant/Appellant 14 is the 
prevailing party because it defeated all of Plaintiff/Appellee's claims. In the 
second legal analysis, Defendant/Appellant 14 is the prevailing party because it 
must be recognized that it prevailed on its breach of contract claim against 
Plaintiff/Appellee. In the third legal analysis, Defendant/Appellant 14 is the 
prevailing party because it prevailed on a single equitable and compulsory 
counterclaim (unjust enrichment). 
A. Defendant/Appellant 14 is the Prevailing Party Because it Defeated 
All of Plaintiff/Appellee's Claims. 
Even if this Court determines that both parties lost their breach of contract 
claims, and that Defendant/Appellant's victory on it compulsory unjust enrichment 
claim is irrelevant to determining who prevailed in this contract action, 
Defendant/Appellant is still the prevailing party for the purposes of awarding 
attorney fees. Authority across the country has recognized that a defendant is the 
5 
prevailing party when he defeats a plaintiffs claims, even if the defendant fails to 
win its own claims. 
"In cases involving the dismissal of both a complaint and a counterclaim, it 
has frequently been held that the defendant is the ffprevailing party," and is entitled 
to recover costs under the applicable statutory provision." 66 A.L.R.3d 1087. "A 
party who is only partially successful also can be deemed a prevailing party. 
Consequently, a claimant who has obtained some relief usually will be regarded as 
the prevailing party even though he has not sustained all his claims." 10 FPP § 
2667 attached hereto as Addendum B. 
The Court must determine which party prevailed in this action, and award 
attorney fees accordingly. 
B. The Parties to this Action Cannot Have Simultaneously Prevailed. 
Utah law recognizes that there can only be one prevailing party in litigation 
arising out of a single transaction. For this reason the Court cannot conclude that 
both 14 and Robertson prevailed, or that neither prevailed. The Court must pick a 
winner. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1998), provides 
that "There can be only one prevailing party in any litigation." (emphasis 
added). Additionally, Chang v. Soldier Summit Dev., 2003 UT App 415,f 27, 82 
P.3d 203 held that "because we agree with both the trial couifs determination that 
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[defendants were the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney fees 
and its decision to award attorney fees to [defendants, an award of attorney fees to 
[p]laintiffs would have been inappropriate." See also Mountain States Broad. Co. 
v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 648 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (holding that the trial court erred 
in awarding both sides their attorney fees, even though the contract at issue 
awarded attorney fees to "the prevailing party" and both sides had "prevailed to 
some extent," on the basis that "there can be only one prevailing party"), clarified 
by 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.App.1989). The term "prevailing party" is defined as 
"'[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered.'" A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing 
& Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73,t 11, 47 P.3d 92 (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 1145 (7th ed.1999)), affd, 2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270. Therefore, "[a] 
party ... is not a prevailing party until after a determination on the merits is made 
by either a jury or a trial court judge." J. V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 
P.2d 8, 13 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (emphasis omitted). 
The Utah Court of Appeals held in Mountain States Broadcasting at 556 that 
"[i]t appears that where both plaintiff and defendant recover in the same action but 
the counterclaim does not arise from the same transaction as the plaintiffs claim, 
both parties may be considered to have prevailed and, therefore, to be entitled to a 
portion of their fees. See, e.g., Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320, 1321-22 (Utah 
7 
1987); Moran v. Lewis, 131 Conn. 680, 41 A.2d 905, 905 (1945). However, this 
rule would not apply here because Mountain States' claim and NBAfs 
counterclaim arose from the same transaction." (emphasis added). By the 
logic of the Utah Court of Appeals in this decision, both parties to the action at bar 
cannot be considered to have prevailed, because, like in Mountain States, one party 
prevailed on a counterclaim arising from the same transaction as 
Plaintiff/Appellee's claims. Therefore, only one party can be the prevailing party 
and that party is 14. 
14 is entitled to attorney fees by the plain language of the contract. 'The 
plain language of the contract provides that the prevailing party has a right to an 
award of attorney fees incurred in the pursuit or defense of an action arising from a 
claimed violation of the contract. Since Equitable incurred fees both in pursuing its 
claim for breach of contract and in defending against David E. Ross II's claim for 
rescission, it is clearly entitled to an award of attorney fees in regard to both 
actions." Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah 
CtApp. 1993). 
As with Equitable, Defendant/Appellant incurred fees defending against 
Plaintiff/Appellee's action. Defendant/Appellant's unjust enrichment claim in the 
case at bar was a defensive action "arising from the claimed violation of the 
8 
contract" and 14 is entitled to attorney fees. 
C. Defendant/Appellant 14 is the Prevailing Party Because it Should be 
Interpreted to Have Won its Breach of Contract Counterclaim. 
As established above, although the trial court awarded damages to 
Defendant/Appellant on its unjust enrichment claim, the trial court also ruled in its 
final judgment that 14 also met each of the elements of its breach of contract claim. 
14 should therefore be interpreted to be the prevailing party on its claim under the 
Contract requiring attorney fees. 
D. Defendant/Appellant 14 is the Prevailing Party Because it Prevailed on 
its Counterclaim For Unjust Enrichment. 
Persuasive federal authority also bears on this analysis. In an action between 
two insurance brokerages in which the court granted summary judgment to the 
defendant on plaintiffs claims and also granted summary judgment to the plaintiff 
on defendant's counterclaims, the court held that the lower court did not err when 
it awarded attorney fees to the defendant under a contractual provision providing 
for the recovery of attorney fees by the "substantially prevailing party," rejecting 
plaintiffs contention that the defendant did not "substantially prevail" 
because it lost on its counterclaims. In so ruling, the court noted that the lower 
court characterized defendants counter-claims as "defensive" in that it brought 
those claims only because they were compulsory, and concluded that plaintiffs 
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claims against the defendant predominated in the litigation, and in securing their 
dismissal the defendant won more than it lost. Tax Track Systems Corp. v. New 
Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2007). 
Even if Defendant/Appellant had not prevailed on any of its compulsory 
counterclaims as with Tax Track Systems (though it did), Defendant/Appellant 14 is 
still entitled to attorneys' fees because it defeated Robertson's claims with 
counterclaims that were "defensive" in nature (i.e. its unjust enrichment claim). 
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS COMPEL AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to Orders and recommendations of the Court, the parties to this 
action mediated in good-faith and discussed settlement on several occasions to no 
avail. Although the amount of the damage award in the matter in controversy 
before the Court is small relative to those of other matters which the Court 
adjudicates, and although an award of attorney fees in this case would likely dwarf 
the compensatory damages award, public policy factors compel the conclusion that 
attorney fees be awarded. Denying an attorney fees award to a prevailing party 
who has negotiated to receive them (particularly a defendant), and who has proven 
non-liability for claims asserted against him, is contrary to sound public policy in 
that it denies innocent parties the ability to escape attempts to extort them to pay 
10 
unjust claims in those situations, such as this, where the damages wrongfully 
claimed total less than the attorney fees necessary to defend against them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's non-
award of attorney fees and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to 
enter an award of attorney fees and costs against Robertson in favor of 14. 14 also 
requests its attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED AND SIGNED this day of April, 2009. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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As provided in Rule 54(d), costs shall be awarded to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs.[FN1] Thus, the determination of who qualifies as a prevailing party is central to 
deciding whether costs are available. 
Usually the litigant in whose favor judgment is rendered is the prevailing party for purposes of 
Rule 54(d).[FN2] This is true whether a party prevails as a result of a full trial on the merits or by way 
of a settlement.[FN3] Further, the prevailing party at a second trial usually is awarded the costs of 
both trials.[FN4] One court has held, however, that a judge is without authority to tax costs against a 
person who was not a party even though he actively prosecuted the litigation in the names of two 
other persons.[FN5] But there is more recent authority to the contrary on the point.[FN6] 
A relatively early case under the federal rules also said that costs are not allowable as a matter of 
course to the successful party in an equity proceeding,[FNZ] but this is not strictly correct. Rule 54(d) 
does not draw any distinction between actions for equitable and those for legal relief. Consequently, 
unless the court otherwise directs, the prevailing party is entitled to recover costs regardless of the 
nature of the lawsuit.[FN8] 
The fact that a party succeeds on the claims presented does not necessarily mean that full costs 
will be recovered, however. For example, the general rule is that a judgment for costs for one party 
may be set off against a judgment for another in the same action.[FN9] Indeed, there is a passage in 
one case that indicates that a judgment for costs in the court of appeals may be set off against a 
judgment for costs in the Supreme Court, but it is a cloudy one.[FN10] Further, this result is unsound 
since a determination of who is the prevailing party for purposes of awarding costs should not depend 
on the position of the parties at each stage of the litigation but should be made when the controversy 
is finally decided. Even the general set-off rule is subject to exceptions with regard to costs. Thus, it 
has been held that a judgment for defendant for costs in a seaman's civil action for personal injuries 
may not be set off against the seaman's recovery in admiralty for cure and maintenance.[FN11] 
Similarly, when defendant is successful on appeal, and the appellate court awards costs of the appeal, 
defendant is entitled to execute on that costs judgment, and it should not be set off against the 
judgment on the merits obtained by plaintiff.[FN12] 
Cost awards for prevailing parties are available to both plaintiffs and defendants.[FN13] Thus, a 
dismissal of the action, whether on the merits or not, generally means that defendant is the 
prevailing party.[FN14] Indeed, it has been held that costs may be awarded to a prevailing defendant 
in a civil-rights action even though the suit was brought by an indigent prisoner because of the need 
to discourage frivolous claims and treat all litigants alike.[FN15] 
A party who is only partially successful also can be deemed a prevailing party. Consequently, a 
claimant who has obtained some relief usually will be regarded as the prevailing party even though he 
has not sustained all his claims.[FN16] In some cases of this type, however, the court will apportion 
costs among the parties[FN17] or reduce the size of the prevailing party's award to reflect the partial 
success.[FN18] Similarly, when the jury finds for plaintiff as to liability, it has been held that plaintiff 
is the prevailing party and entitled to costs even though the jury determines that plaintiff has suffered 
no more than nominal damages.[FN19] 
Further, in suits seeking injunctive relief, if the defendant alters its conduct so that plaintiffs claim 
becomes moot before judgment is reached, costs may be allowed if the court finds that the changes 
were the result, at least in part, of plaintiff's litigation.[FN20] The key in these cases is whether the 
plaintiff actually has gained some benefit, either directly or indirectly, from the litigation. If not, the 
mootness of plaintiff's claim may prevent a finding that plaintiff is a prevailing party entitled to 
attorney's fees. Thus, in Rhodes v. Stewart,[FN21] the Supreme Court held that when an action 
challenging prison officials who had refused permission to subscribe to a magazine was not brought 
as a class action, and one of the two inmates had died prior to the issuance of the district court's 
order and the other had been released from prison prior to the order, neither was a prevailing party 
under Section 1988 of Title 42. The fact that the court entered a declaratory judgment finding that 
plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated was immaterial because that 
judgment could not affect the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff since plaintiffs no longer 
were within defendant's control. 
The definition of who qualifies as the prevailing party for purposes of costs sometimes becomes 
complicated in multiparty disputes.[FN22] In some instances, the same general rules prevail. Thus, 
an intervenor is entitled to the same cost considerations as the original parties.[FN23] Similarly, a 
successful counterclaimant generally will be considered the prevailing party when plaintiff fails to 
recover or is awarded less than defendant receives on the counterclaim.[FN24] Not every party who 
appears to have been successful necessarily will qualify as the prevailing party, however, because the 
joinder of parties or claims may result in some other litigant being more deserving of costs.[FN25] For 
example, a defendant may be liable for the costs of a third-party defendant if the former prevails in 
the original action so that the latter is released from liability,[FN26] and the third-party defendant 
also may be able to collect costs from the original plaintiff if the plaintiff loses, at least when the 
third-party defendant has vigorously defended the actions of the original defendant.[FN27] A party 
who effectively interpleads adverse claimants is generally the prevailing party, however, and is 
entitled to costs for the first stage of the interpleader.[FIM28] 
[FNa45] Charles Alan Wright Chair in Federal Courts, The University of Texas. 
[FNa46] Bruce Bromley Professor of Law, Harvard University. 
[FINa47] John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, Chancellor and Dean Emeritus, 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
[FN1] Otherwise directs 
A discussion of how the courts have exercised their discretion in awarding costs appears 
in § 2668. 
[FN2] Judgment winner 
Defendant who did not obtain a judgment in its favor in the trial court was not a 
"prevailing party" by virtue of its successful post-trial motion in obtaining a reduction of 
plaintiff's damages award, and thus the district court erred in taxing defendant's post-
trial, pre-appeal costs against plaintiff. Republic Tobacco Co. v. North Atl. Trading Co., 
C.A.7th, 2007, 481 F.3d 442. 
Denial of ERISA benefits claimant's request for an award of costs on the ground that she 
was not a "prevailing party/ ' having sued to prevent a setoff against her benefits based 
on any portion of a workers' compensation award but having succeded merely in limiting 
the amount of the setoff to the net amount of the workers' compensation award, as 
reduced by attorney fees and expenses that she incurred in obtaining that award, was 
based on an erroneous standard of what it means to be a "prevailing party" and 
constituted an abuse of discretion; by her efforts, the claimant had succeeded in 
changing the legal relationship between herself and the plans and had obtained more 
than $20,000. Leonard_y. Southwestern Bell Corp.disability Income Plan, C.A.8ih, 2Q05, 
408 F.3d 528. 
Terminated employee was the only prevailing party, in a Title VII action, for purposes of 
entitlement to costs, when he prevailed on a claim that the employer created a hostile-
work environment under Title VI I , even though the employee lost on the claims that his 
termination was discriminatory and that he was discharged in retaliation for the assertion 
of protected rights. Barbery. T.D. Williamson, Inc., C. A. 10th, 2001, 254 F.311223, 
1234, quoting Wright, Miller & Kane. 
In former employee's action against his former employer for violation of the ADA and 
wrongful discharge, the former employer was the "prevailing party" entitled to an award 
of costs after the district court entered summary judgment in its favor, even though an 
appeal by the former employee was pending. Hoeller v.JEaton Corp., C.A.7th, 1998, 149 
F.3d 621. 
Patentee's competitor who received no money damages but obtained a declaration that 
patentee's patents were invalid and succeeded on the patentee's counterclaim for patent 
infringement damages was a "prevailing party" entitled to an award of costs. Manildra 
Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., CA.Fed. 1996, 76 F.3d 1178, citing Wright, Miller & 
Kane. 
Father was entitled to award of costs as "prevailing party" in an action by nonresident 
mother for return of child to Germany pursuant to International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act, when father won case in the district court but case was mooted by tragic 
happenstance of child's death while mother's appeal was pending. Slagenweit v. 
Slagenweit, C.A.8th, 1995, 63 F.3d 719. 
Robinson Farms Co. v. D'Acquisto, C.A.7th, 1992, 962 F.2d 68 0, 683, citing Wright, 
Miller & Kane. 
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,Jnc, C.A.4th, 1978, 580 J ^ d 1222. 
Constantino v. American S/T Achilles, C.A.4th, 1978, 580 F.2d 121. 
In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, CA.Sth, 1978, J577 F.2d 910, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 
843, 439 IKS. 1072, 59 L.Ed.2d 38. 
Nationwide BIdg. Maintenance Inc. v. Sampson, C.A.D.C.1977, 559 F.2d 704, 708, citing 
Wright & Miller. 
An award of costs to plaintiffs for the first trial, at which the jury verdict was for 
defendant, was not an abuse of discretion, since, though plaintiffs' motion for new trial 
was granted through no fault of defendant, plaintiffs were the ultimate prevailing parties. 
Givens v. Lederle, C.A.5th, 1977, 556 F.2d 1341. 
A widow was the prevailing party within the rule authorizing an award of costs, even 
though defendant was entitled to a setoff against the judgment for reasons extraneous to 
the dispute between the two parties. d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., C.A.9th, 1977, 
552 F.2d 886, 896, citing Wright & Miller. 
Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, PA., C.A.3d, 1976, 530 F.2d 536. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, C.A.D.C.1974, 505 F.2d 386 
When the real contest in a tort action in admiralty to recover for damage to plaintiffs 
dock facilities was between the defendants rather than between plaintiff and defendants 
and plaintiff had prevailed on all the issues, plaintiff was entitled to recover costs. Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Tug Pensacola, C.A.5th, 1973, 472 F.2d 1175. 
Limousine drivers were the "prevailing party" in their putative collective action under the 
FLSA against the operator of a limousine service and its parent, seeking recovery of 
unpaid overtime compensation, as required to obtain an award of costs, although they 
obtained an award of $300,000 in damages when they had sought approximately 
$15,000,000. Powell v. Carey Intern., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
Party who prevailed in an underlying patent-infringement action was entitled to an award 
of costs, when the district court granted summary judgment in the prevailing party's 
favor on all issues, and the losing party did not overcome the presumption in favor of 
awarding costs to the prevailing party. Leggett & Piatt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 
D.C.III.2001, 149 F.Supp.2d 394. 
Insurance Commissioner as receiver was "prevailing party" since Commissioner obtained 
a favorable verdict on two of four counts and was awarded damages in excess of $13 
million, and, thus, the Commissioner was entitled to costs other than attorney fees. Clark 
v. Milam, D.C.W.Va.1995, 891 F^Supp. 268. 
Green Constr. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., D.C.Kan. 1994, 153 F.R.D. 670, 674, 
citing Wright, Miller & Kane. 
AIJLWest Pet Supply Co.__v.JHill's Pet Prods. Diy., Colgate-Palmolive Co., JXC.Kan. 1994, 
153 F.R.D. 667, 669, citing Wright, Miller & Kane. 
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Florida, D.C.FIa.1981, 521 F.Supp. 297, 304, citing Wright & 
Miller. 
Costs would be allowed the plaintiff as a party who had prevailed by way of a motion for 
summary judgment and who had not unduly extended nor complicated the resolution of 
the issues. Peterson v. Crown Financial Corp., D.C.Pa.1980, 498 F.Supp. 1177. 
Neloms v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., D.C.La.1977, 440 F.Supp. 1353. 
Shires v. Magnavox Co.7 D.CTenn.1976, 432 F.Supp. 231. 
Tasby v. Estes, D.C.Tex.1976, 416 F.Supp. 644. 
Collins v. Retail Credit Co., D.C iMich.l976, 415 F.Supp,, 92_4 (consumer successful in 
action to enforce liability for noncompliance with Fair Credit Reporting Act). 
Glassman Constr. Co. v. Maryland City Plaza, Inc., D.C.Md.1974, 371 F.Supp. 1154. 
Compare 
Plaintiff who obtained a judgment with no damages was not a "prevailing party" 
presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 54(d)(1). Tunison v. Continental Airlines 
Corp., C.A.D.C.1998, 162 F.3d 1187, 1189, citing Wright, Miller & Kane. 
Attorney's fees 
For purposes of a claim for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, an alien was a 
"prevailing party" in his action seeking a writ of mandamus directing the United Stats 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
adjudicate his pending application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, 
despite the claim that the USCIS voluntarily agreed to adjudicate the alien's application 
once he submitted a replacement form; the court's ruling was a binding judgment that 
altered the legal relationship between the parties in exactly the manner requested by the 
alien, and an eleventh-hour promise to adjudicate the application did not negate the 
necessity of the court's order or remove the judicial imprimatur thereof. Aboushaban v. 
Mueller, D.C.CaL2007^ 475JF.Supp.2d 943. 
Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, it is the prevailing party rather than 
the lawyer who is entitled to attorney's fees and thus the attorney lacked standing to 
claim fees in his own name as real party in interest. Brown v. G^ner^Motor^CorjD,^ 
C.A.2d, 1983, 722 F.2d 1009. 
In plaintiff surety company's suit seeking a declaration that the contractor's bond issued 
in its name had been forged, the district court did not abuse its discretion, after declaring 
void the contractor's bond, in denying a motion for attorney fees filed by the 
representative of the losing defendant class since neither state nor federal law supported 
a fee award to a nonprevailing party. Western Sur. Co. v. Lums of Cranston, Inc., 
C.A.lst, 1980, 618 F.2d 854. 
A Caucasian female, who brought an employment-discrimination suit against the Hawaii 
Department of Labor and Industrial Relations for discriminatory employment practices in 
favor of Japanese-American males and who obtained a judgment in her favor and relief in 
the form of retroactive promotion, back pay and all the employee benefits she would 
have received had she been promoted, was the "prevailing party" for purposes of 
determining attorney fees, although damages had not been calculated yet. Feher v. 
Department of Labor & Indus. Relations, D.C.Haw.1983, 561 F.Supp. 757. 
For a discussion of the difficulties in identifying prevailing parties for attorney fees 
purposes, see Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the 
Problem, 1986 Duke LJ. 435,449-455. 
But compare 
The illegal alien did not prevail in his action against the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service when he obtained a temporary restraining order preventing his deportation and 
extension of his voluntary departure date; rather, the court merely preserved the status 
quo by warding off threatened irreparable harm, and, therefore, the alien's attorneys 
were not entitled to recover fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Rico-
Sorio v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., D.C.Or.1982, 552 F.Supp. 965. 
Bid protestor was not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the Equal Access to 
Justice Act in a bid-protest action against the contracting government agency, precluding 
an award of attorney fees and costs to the protestor; there was no final judgment on the 
merits or written finding issued in the bid protest, and the trial court's remarks at a 
hearing on a temporary restraining order were insufficient to establish that the 
contracting agency had acted unlawfully. Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. U.S., 
C.A.Fed.2002, 288 F.3d 1371, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 871, 537 U.S. 1106, 154 
L.Ed.2d 775. 
[FN3] Settlement 
When the products-liability action was tried on the merits, and the jury found, in 
response to special interrogatories, that plaintiffs injuries were caused by a defect in the 
tire which was present when the tire left the manufacturer's control, plaintiff was the 
"prevailing party" entitled to costs, even though the parties worked out a settlement 
concerning the issue of damages rather than submitting the issue to the jury. Liedberg v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., D.C.Ga.1984, 102 F.R.D. 249. 
Dillard v. City of Foley, D.C.AIa.l998f 995 F.Supp. 1358. 
Attorney's fees 
To be considered a prevailing party for purposes of determining attorney fees in a civil-
rights action, plaintiff need not have succeeded at the trial on the merits, so long as 
through settlement or otherwise plaintiff has vindicated his or her rights. Illinois Welfare 
Rights Organization y. Miller, CA.7th, 1983,_723 F.2d 564. 
Although the securities fraud action was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs with prejudice 
pursuant to the parties' stipulation, defendants were "prevailing parties" so as to be 
entitled to attorney fees under the applicable rule when the stipulation and order of 
dismissal expressly reserved to them the right to move for costs and disbursements. 
Nemeroff v. Abelsonr C.A.2d, 1980, 620 F.2d 33 9. 
Parties applying for attorney fees, each of whom played an instrumental role in the 
negotiations that produced the stipulated plans adopted by the court and each of whom 
had received a significant amount of the relief they prayed for when they entered a suit 
challenging the constitutionality of the 1981 reapportionment of the state legislature and 
Arizona's congressional districts, were prevailing parties, within the meaning of the Civil 
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act. G_odda_rd v..Babbitt,.D.C.Ariz. 1982, 547 F.Supp. 373. 
In a § 1983 action, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs may be considered a prevailing 
party under the applicable fee-shifting statute when they resolved their dispute with 
defendants through a private settlement over which the district court retained 
enforcement jurisdiction; judicial action other than a judgment on the merits or a consent 
decree can support an award of fees, so long as that action carries with it sufficient 
judicial imprimatur, and the district court's retention of jurisdiction carried sufficient 
judicial approval of the settlement to support the award of fees. Roberson v. Giuliani, 
C.A.2d, 2003, 346 F.3d Z5_. 
[FN4] Prevail at second trial 
When, after a district-court judgment for plaintiff in an action on a note was vacated and 
remanded by the court of appeals, the district court again entered judgment for plaintiff, 
the taxing of costs of the first trial and the first appeal against plaintiff was improper. 
Yedlin v. Lewis, C.A.5th, 1963, 320 F.2d 15. 
Mederv. Everest & Jennings, Inc., D.C.Mo.1982, 553 F.Supp. 149, 150, citing Wright & 
Miller. 
Farmery. Arabian Am. Oil Co., D.C.N.Y.1962, 31 F.R.D. 191, reversed on other grounds 
C.A.2d, 1963, 324 F.2d 359, reversed 1964, 85 S.Ct. 411 , 379 U.S. 227, 13 L.Ed.2d 248. 
Connolly v. Commercial Nat. Bankjjn Shreveport, D.C.La.1950, 89„FiSupjD._976, amended 
on other grounds D.C.La.1950, 90 F.Supp. 264, modified on other grounds C.A.5th, 
1951, 189 F.2d 608. 
But compare 
California Fruit Exchange v. Henry, D.C.Pa.1951, 94 F.Supp. 653. 
[FN5J Not a party 
Strong v. Broward County Kennel Club, D.C.FIa.1948, 77 F.Supp. 262, appeal dismissed 
C.A.5th, 1948, 170 F.2d 72. 
Compare 
In an unsuccessful class action, eight representatives were jointly and severally liable for 
the award of costs, but neither the federal rules nor due process would tolerate an award 
against class members who were not given notice and an opportunity to opt out of the 
case. White v. Sundstrand Corp., C.A.7th, 2001, 256 F.3d 580. 
[FN6] Contrary authority 
In an employment-discrimination action by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission against the employer and the union, the trial court, following a settlement 
between the EEOC and the employer, did not abuse its discretion, in assessing in equal 
portions among the parties the $2,500 fee of the special master appointed to hear the 
case, when the union had taken an active part in the litigation by seeking to realign itself 
as a plaintiff to the action, by appearing at the preliminary pretrial conference, by filing 
an answer to the complaint, by stipulating as to the dismissal of the party defendant, and 
by filing the memorandum opposing the employer's motion to dismiss. EEOC v. 
International Union of Ejec., Radio & Mach. Workers,J\FL-CIO, CLC, Local 758, C.A,6th, 
1980, 631 F.2d_81, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 565, 449 ILS. 10_10, 66 L,Ed.2d 468. 
When the mother of the deceased, after collecting workmen's compensation in South 
Carolina from the insurance carrier of the deceased's employer, brought an action in a 
federal district court in South Carolina against the alleged joint tortfeasors for the death 
of the deceased, and the insurance carrier endorsed on the bottom of the complaint a 
consent that the action be brought without waiving any rights as subrogee under the 
applicable compensation statute, and the amended complaint was filed alleging that the 
insurance carrier was subrogated to the extent of $8,000 and the insurance carrier 
obtained an order from the district court allowing it to file pleadings setting up a lien for 
the $8,000 it had paid, and summary judgment was entered on the merits for the alleged 
joint tortfeasors, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal, and certiorari was denied, 
judgment would be entered against the insurance carrier for costs taxed against the 
mother and in favor of the alleged joint tortfeasors, even though the insurance carrier 
was not a named plaintiff and even though it permitted the litigation to be handled by 
counsel for the estate of the deceased. Berry v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 
D.C.S.C.1960, 185 F.Supp. 699. 
[FN7] Equity proceeding 
Crutcher v. Joyce, C.C.A.lOth, 1945, 146 F.2d 518. 
[FN8] Practice applicable 
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, C.A.3d, 1985, 758 F.2d 897, 
926, quoting Wright, Miller & Kane. 
Unless otherwise provided by statute or a rule of court, costs in equity do not always 
follow the outcome of the suit, but rest in the sound discretion of the court according to 
the justice of the cause or the facts and circumstances of the particular case, although 
the prevailing party is prima facie entitled to costs, and it is incumbent on the 
unsuccessful party to show circumstances sufficient to overcome that presumption. In re 
Northern Indiana Oil Co^CLA^th, 1951, 192 F.2d 139. 
Because of the deliberateness of plaintiff manufacturer's acts of trademark infringement 
and unfair competition, defendant manufacturer was entitled to its costs as part of the 
judgment in an action charging trademark infringement and antitrust violations. American 
Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme Labs., Inc., D.C.III.1968, 291 F.Supp. 645, 654, affirmed in 
part, reversed in part C.A.7th, 1970, 420 FJ>d 1248, defendant's petition for certiorari 
denied 90 S.Ct. 1820, 398_U.S.„929, 26 L.Ed.2d 9 1 , plaintiff's petition for certiorari 
denied 91 S.Ct. 37, 400 U.S. 820, 27 L.Ed.2d 47. 
Brown v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., CXC.Del. 1955, 18 FJR.D^433. 
[FN9] Set-off 
Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. v. Forman, C.A.5th, 1979, 600 F.2d 4 8 1 , 485, quoting 
Wright & Miller. 
As a set-off against the costs allowed defendant, which prevailed on appeal, the district 
court properly allowed plaintiff the expenses it incurred in preparing for a deposition that 
was precipitously canceled by defense counsel's last-minute announcement that the 
deponent would not appear. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, C.A.2d, 1975, 515 F.2d 
173, noted 1975, 8 Conn.L.Rev. 149, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 1147, 424 U.S. 934, 47 
L.Ed.2d 341. 
[FN 10] Court of appeals costs 
Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., C.A.4th, 1948, 170 F.2d 770, 772, certiorari 
denied 69 S.Ct. 1149, 337 U.S. 920, 93 L.Ed. 1729. 
[FN11] Seaman's action 
Cornell v. GyltQLLCpjrp.^ D_,CPaJL9_40^_35 F.Supp. 448. 
See also 
Taylor v. Calmar S. S. Co., D.C.Pa.1938, 35 F.Supp. 335. 
[FN12] No offset 
Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor, C.A.9th, 1957, 252 F.2d 589, 606. 
Broffe v. Horton, C.A.2d, 194_9, 173 F.2d 56„5. 
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jacobson, D.C.Mo.1965, 37 F.R.D. 427 (a careful and scholarly 
discussion of the question by Judge John W. Oliver). 
[FN13] Defendants prevail 
The mere fact that plaintiff, as the unsuccessful party in a patent-infringement action, 
was an ordinary party acting in good faith and neither harassing defendants nor abusing 
legal process was not in itself sufficient to overcome the presumption that defendants 
were entitled to costs as prevailing parties. Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec, Inc., 
C.A.7th, 1975, 516 F.2d 772. 
Defendant was entitled to costs of $1,851.91 as the "prevailing party" in a civil action in 
which plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted a claim in excess of $83,000 and defendant 
unsuccessfully asserted a counterclaim for $4,494, since only a very small fraction of the 
five-day trial was spent on the proof and defense of the counterclaim, and defendant 
successfully defended against plaintiffs much larger claim for damages. Lacovara v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, D.C.Pa.1984, 102 F.FLD. 959. 
Judgment for defendant on a motion for summary judgment, unlike dismissal of plaintiffs 
complaint with prejudice, is one on which defendant is the prevailing party and entitled to 
costs, unless the trial court can articulate justification for denial. IAP, Inc. v. Mercedes-
Benz of N. America, Inc., D.C.N.J. 1983, 571 F.Supp. 262. 
A defendant who successfully prosecutes an antitrust counterclaim may tax the statutory 
bill of costs as a prevailing party. North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 
D.C.N.Y.1980, 505 F.Supp. 659. 
General Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Bridgeport Broadcasting Station, Inc., D.C.Conn.1931, 
53 F.2dJ64 (defendant is prevailing party upon denial of permanent injunction despite 
grant of temporary injunction). 
In a negligence action brought by a passenger in a vehicle that was rear-ended by 
another vehicle against the drivers of both vehicles, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding costs to both drivers after the claims against one driver were 
dismissed at the summary-judgment stage, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
other driver; the case was not a close and difficult one, and the fact that the passenger 
acted in good faith and with propriety in bringing the action, standing alone, was 
insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of an award of costs to the prevailing 
party. McDonald v. Petree, C.A.6th, 2005, 409 F.3d 724. 
Award of costs other than attorney's fees to defendant city, in an action under the Clean 
Water Act alleging that the city was violating its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System permits, was proper, even if plaintiffs' claim was not frivolous, meritless, or 
vexatious because Rule 54(d) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the 
prevailing party. Russian River Watershed Protection Comm. v. Santa Rosa, C.A.9th, 
1998, 142 F.3d 1136. 
Prevailing defendant corporations in a securities-fraud action were entitled to an award of 
costs, when the district court granted summary judgment on all of plaintiffs' federal 
claims and dismissed the state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tirapelli 
v. Advanced Equities, Inc., ELC.IN.2002, 222 F.Supp,2d_1081. 
[FN14] Dismissal 
Fact that plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the state-law claims before trial was sufficient to 
confer prevailing party status on defendants for those claims for purposes of an award of 
costs. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, C.A.9th, 1997, 108 F.3d 205. 
In cases not involving settlement, when a party dismisses an action with or without 
prejudice, the district court has discretion to award costs to the prevailing party. Cantrell 
v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIQ, Local 2021, C.A.lOth, 1995, 69 F.3d 
456. 
For purposes of awarding costs, defendant city and individual defendants were prevailing 
parties in former city employee's civil-rights action when the district court granted 
summary judgment to defendants on the employee's federal constitutional claims, 
although the federal claims constituted only a small portion of the employee's claims, and 
the district court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the 
employee's remaining state law claims. Head v. Medford, C.A. 11th, 1995, 62 F.3d 351. 
Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., U.S.A., C.A.5thr 1990, 891 F.2d 533, 53 9, citing 
Wright, Miller & Kane. 
Schwarz v. Folloder, C.A.5th, 1985, 767 F.2d 125, 131, citing Wright, Miller & Kane. 
Poe v. John Deere Co., C.A.8th, 1982, 695 F.2d 1103 (costs assessed against losing 
plaintiff in employment discrimination action). 
Sapp v. Renfroe, C.A.5th, 1975, 511 F.2d 172. 
"Where, as here, a defendant has been put to the expense of making an appearance and 
of obtaining an order for the clarification of the complaint, and the plaintiff then 
voluntarily dismisses without amending his pleading, the party sued is the prevailing 
party within the spirit and intent of the statute." Corcoran v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 
C.C.A.9th, 1941, 121 F.2d 575, 576. 
Fernandez v. Southside Hosp., D.C.N.Y.1984, 593 F.Supp. 840, 843, citing Wright & 
Miller. 
Under the rule allowing the court to award costs to the "prevailing party," when the 
action has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, defendant is the "prevailing party." 
Lepucki v. Van Wormer, D.C.Ind.1984, 587 F.Supp. 1390, affirmed per curiam C.A.7th, 
1985, 765 F.2d 8j6, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 8 6 , J 4 7 4 UJS, 827^ 88i-_,Ed,2d 7 1 . 
Even though the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim was without prejudice and was not a 
dismissal on the merits, defendants were "prevailing parties" for purpose of taxing costs. 
Anderson v. Christian Hosp, Northeast-Northwest, D.C.MoJ.984, 100 F.R.D._497, 498, 
citing Wright, Miller & Kane. 
The fact that the complaint was brought in good faith is not alone a ground for denying 
costs to prevailing parties and a defendant put to the expense and inconvenience equal 
to that of the other defendants up to point of plaintiff's consent to the dismissal of 
defendant after reading defendant's memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss was 
entitled to recover the costs of defending. Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 
D.C.N.Y.1980, 496 F.Supp. 546. 
Defendant was entitled to costs as the prevailing party after plaintiff failed to obtain a 
preliminary injunction and subsequently asked for a dismissal with prejudice. Stratton 
Group, Ltd. v. Chelsea Nat. Bank, D.C.N.Y.1972^ 54 F.R._D . 227. 
When plaintiffs who brought an employment discrimination suit mistakenly joined a union 
local as a defendant, upon dismissal of the action against the union local costs would be 
taxed against plaintiffs even though plaintiffs had sued the local in reliance upon the ill-
advised encouragement of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Collins v. 
Union Carbide Corp., Chem. Div., D.C.Tex.1971, 52 F.R.D. 208. 
Oster v. Rubinstein, D.C.N.Y.1956, 142 F.Supp, 62_0. 
Texas Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., D.C.III.1953, 114 F.Supp. 144, affirmed C.A.7th, 1955, 
225 F.2d 725. 
Prevailing employer was entitled to a costs award to the extent its costs were solely 
allocable to claims that the seamen effectively voluntarily dismissed by not submitting 
them to the jury and the dismissed claims were subject to the prevailing-party costs rule. 
Gwin v. American River Transportation Co., C,A.7th, 2007, 48J2J\3d 96_9. 
Civil-rights defendants who obtained a voluntary dismissal of plaintiffs claims with 
prejudice were "prevailing parties," who might be entitled to an award of costs under 
Rule 54(d). Mathews v. Crosby, C .A. l l th , 2007, 480 F.3d 1265. 
Officials of the county public-school system prevailed in a suspended teacher's procedural 
due-process action, as required for the award of costs, even though the teacher's claims 
against the teaching assistant had been remanded to the state court, when all of the 
teacher's federal claims had been dismissed. Jefferson v. Jefferson County Pub.jSchooJ 
Sys., C.A.6th, 2004, 360 F.3d 583. 
The district court acted beyond its authority when it precluded the city from requesting 
costs after the court dismissed the federal claims against the city with prejudice under 
the voluntary-dismissal rule; costs were to be awarded to the prevailing party under the 
rule permitting an award of costs to the prevailing party and nothing in the voluntary-
dismissal rule indicated that after a voluntary dismissal the prevailing party should not 
enjoy the normal benefits of a final judgment in its favor. Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 
C.A.7th, 2003, 338 F.3d 704. 
The State was the prevailing party, in the context of an award of costs by the district 
court under Rule 54(d), even though the employee's lawsuit against the State under the 
American with Disabilities Act (ADA) was dismissed, due to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, without prejudice to the right of the employee to seek any available relief in 
the state court; that disposition was a material alteration in the legal relationship of the 
parties because the dismissal eliminated the federal ADA claim from further proceedings 
in the federal court. Miles v. California, C.A.9th, 2003, 320 F.3d 986. 
Compare 
Plaintiff competitor's voluntary dismissal with prejudice of its action against a cable-
television-service provider and municipality for an alleged violation of the Sherman Act 
and § 1983 did not mean that defendant was by definition the prevailing party under Rule 
54 and entitled to costs; the dismissal did not mean that there was no value to plaintiff in 
having the declaratory judgment and injunctive relief that was entered on its behalf, even 
if it subsequently decided not to make use of those rulings and to dismiss the suit. 
Knology, Inc. v. Insight Communications Co., C.A.6th, 2006, 460 F.3d 722. 
But compare 
Plaintiff, who prevailed in an administrative action before the Department of Agriculture 
but whose complaint was dismissed by the district court because the statute that plaintiff 
had invoked was not applicable to the transaction, was entitled to costs. Guenther v. 
Morehead, D.C.Iowa 1967, 272 F.Supp. 721 (applying 7 U.S.C.A. § 210). 
Attorney's fees 
When the action has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, defendant is the 
"prevailing party," for purposes of an attorney fee award. Komasinski v. Internal Revenue 
Serv., D.C.Ind.1984, 588 F.Supp. 974. 
The Seventh Circuit held that a district court's lack of jurisdiction over the merits of an 
environmental organization's action against a steel manufacturer under the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, due to lack of a redressable injury, did not 
preclude jurisdiction over the manufacturer's subsequent request for attorneys' fees; 
since a dismissal for want of jurisdiction forecloses plaintiff's claim, defendant is the 
"prevailing party." Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., C.A.7th, 2000, 230 
F.3d 923, certiorari denied 121 S.Ct. 1653, 532 U.S. 994, 149 L.Ed.2d 636. 
But compare 
Defendant school district was not "prevailing party" entitled to recover attorney fees 
when former superintendent voluntarily dismissed his civil-rights case with prejudice prior 
to any judicial determination on the merits; defendant school district was unable to point 
to any judicial declaration to its benefit, district had not filed any dispositive motion, trial 
court had not addressed merits as to any of superintendent's claims, and there was no 
evidence to indicate that superintendent voluntarily dismissed his complaint to avoid 
adverse judicial determination on the merits. Hughes v. Unified School Dist. #330, 
Wabaunsee County, Kansas, D.C.Kan.1994, 872 F.Supp. 882. 
In an action in which defendant sought attorney's fees after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed 
its § 1988 action, the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant is not a prevailing party within 
the meaning of § 1988 when a civil-rights plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his claim, unless 
defendant can demonstrate that plaintiff withdrew to avoid an unfavorable judgment on 
the merits and, once this affirmative determination has been made, defendant then must 
establish that plaintiff's suit was frivolous, groundless, or without merit. Dean_y. Riser v. 
C.A.5th, 2_001,__240 F3d 505. 
[FNJL5] Costs against indigent 
The district court's decision in a civil-rights action by a prison inmate, not to reduce the 
costs awarded to defendants who had obtained a voluntary dismissal with prejudice 
based on the inmate's indigency, was not an abuse of discretion, when the magistrate 
judge's report and recommendation went through an extensive analysis of each individual 
cost and whether the inmate was entitled to a reduction of costs due to his indigence. 
Mathews v. Crosby, C .A . l l t h , 2007, 480 F.3d 1265. 
Award of costs served valuable purpose of discouraging unmeritorious claims and treated 
unsuccessful litigants alike rather than having improper chilling effect on prisoners' civil 
rights litigation. McGill v. Faulkner, C.A.7th, 1994, 18 F.3d 456, certiorari denied 115 
S.Ct. 233,_513 U.S. 889, 130 L.Ed.2d 157. 
Award of $3857.35 in costs against inmate who was unsuccessful in a § 1983 action 
